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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of cartel behavior and its effect on market performance in oligopoly is a 
theoretical issue in industrial organization and a public (competition and anti-trust) 
policy concern. Recently, many researches have analyzed collusion and market 
concentration in the context of markets influenced by the progress of information and 
communication technologies, in which network externalities and compatibility between 
products and services exist. 
In network industries (e.g., video decoders, personal computers, smartphones, 
application software, operation systems, and Internet services), compatibility and 
standardization of products and services are important for both providers and users of 
such products. Compatibility (interoperability and interconnectivity) is a characteristic 
of products and services that interact with other products and services to enhance 
performance for users.1  
   Focusing on network externalities and compatibility, recent literature considered 
whether market concentration plays a role in sustaining collusion. For example, see 
Lambertini, et al. (1998), Pal and Scrimitore (2016), Rasch (2017), and Song and Wang 
(2017), all of which are related to our paper. Currently, market concentration and 
monopolization is observed in various forms (e.g., cartels, collusions, mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures), including in network industries such as 
telecommunications and Internet services. 
                                                 
1 Estimating network effects and compatibility in the Polish mobile market, Grajek 
(2010) finds strong network effects. Furthermore, Gandal (1995) empirically analyzes 
complementary network externalities in PC software markets, in which users need to 
exchange data files between spreadsheets and database management systems. 
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The abovementioned papers mainly consider the sustainability (stability) of 
collusion by introducing an infinitely repeated game. Pal and Scrimitore (2016) 
examine the case of oligopoly, with firms competing on quantities in a homogenous 
product market. Song and Wang (2017) analyze the case of a horizontally differentiated 
duopoly competing in quantity. Rasch (2017) addresses the case where firms collude on 
prices in a Hotelling-type market. 
In this paper, we consider the effect of collusion on social welfare as well as the 
sustainability of collusion. The welfare effect has not been analyzed in the previous 
literature mentioned above. In particular, we appreciate that introducing a common 
standard to make products and services compatible (interconnectable and interoperable) 
is an important consideration with network externalities; therefore, we focus on the role 
of compatibility under collusion. With respect to collusive behavior in our model, we 
make the following assumptions: (i) the output level is determined through a 
cooperative decision that involves maximizing joint profits; and (ii) the level of 
compatibility (standardization between the products) is assumed to be higher or 
upgraded compared to the case of noncooperative competition. 
   Assumption (ii) is particularly important. Given these assumptions, we demonstrate 
that collusion improves social welfare, compared with the case of noncooperative 
Cournot competition, if the level of compatibility between the products under collusion 
is sufficiently large, given that a network externality is strong. In this case, the collusion 
is sustainable. 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1 Preliminary 
We develop a duopoly model in a network industry, where each firm provides a 
horizontally differentiated product with a network compatibility effect. Applying the 
frameworks of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we assume a linear inverse 
demand function of firm i’s product as follows: 
),( eijii SNqqAp                                    (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size of product i, iq  is the output of firm i, and 
 1,0  represents the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, )( eiSN  is the 
network externality function, where eiS  represents the expected network size of firm 
i’s product. We assume a liner network externality function,   ,eiei nSSN   where 
 1,0n  represents the level of network externality. Using equation (3.15) in Shy (2001, 
p. 62), the expected network size of product i is given by: 
,ejk
e
i
e
i qqS   ,, NCk                                (2) 
where  1,0k  denotes the level of product i’s compatibility (interoperability and 
interconnectivity) with the other firms’ product j, and subscript C (N) denotes the case 
of collusion (noncooperative Cournot competition).  
Considering the concept of a fulfilled expectation, we assume that consumers 
develop expectations for network sizes before the firms make their output decisions.2 
                                                 
2 See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996). In the Appendix, we examine 
the case of consumers’ ex post expectations, i.e., where consumers’ expectations for 
network size are determined after the firms make their output decisions and where the 
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Thus, when deciding the output level, the expected network sizes are given for the 
firms. 
For the following analysis, we make some important assumptions: 
 
Assumption 
(i) .01  NC   
(ii) .n  
 
Assumption (i) implies that the level of compatibility (interconnectivity) under 
collusion is larger than that in the case of noncooperative competition, i.e., the level of 
compatibility among the firms’ products is upgraded as a result of collusion. This 
implies the existence of one kind of scale economy and of synergy effects on the 
demand side, i.e., consumption externalities. Assumption (ii) implies a strong network 
externality. Otherwise, i.e., if ,n  irrespective of the level of compatibility between 
the products, we have the same results as in the related literature analyzing collusion in 
the case of Cournot oligopoly (e.g., Song and Wang, 2017). 
Furthermore, we assume that production costs are zero, because we observe low and 
even negligible marginal running costs in Internet businesses. 
 
2.2 Noncooperative Cournot competition 
We consider the initial situation where the firms noncooperatively compete on 
quantities à la Cournot in the market. Based on equation (1), the profit function of firm i 
is given by: 
                                                                                                                                               
firms affect the network size. 
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  .)( ieijii qSNqqA                                 (3) 
The first-order condition (FOC) of profit-maximization is: 
.0)(2 
 e
ijiii
i
i SNqqAqp
q
                     (4) 
At the point of a fulfilled expectation, i.e., when i
e
i qq   and ,jej qq   in view of 
equations (2) and (4), we obtain the following: 
.0)()2(  jNi qnqnA                              (5) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,Nji qqq   we derive the following 
fulfilled expectation Cournot equilibrium: 
.
)(2 N
N nn
Aq                                     (6) 
Note that Nn  denotes the level of network compatibility effect under noncooperative 
competition. Because it holds that ,NN qp   based on equation (4), the profit in the 
case of noncooperative Cournot competition is expressed as   .2NN q  
 
2.3 Collusion 
Here, we examine the case of collusion in the market where each firm determines output 
to maximize the following joint profits: 
    .)()( jejijieiji
jiC
qSNqqAqSNqqA 



            (7) 
Equation (7) implies that a multiproduct monopoly decides the output of product i and j 
to maximize its profit. The FOC is given by: 
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.0)(22 
 e
ijijii
i
C SNqqAqqp
q
            (8) 
At the point of a fulfilled expectation, i.e., when i
e
i qq   and ,jej qq   in view of 
equations (2) and (8), we obtain the following: 
.0)2()2(  jCi qnqnA                              (9) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,Cji qqq   we derive the following 
collusive fulfilled expectation equilibrium: 
.
)2(2 C
C nn
Aq                                    (10) 
Note that Cn  denotes the level of a network compatibility effect under collusion. In 
this case, both firms ensure standardization of their products, so that the level of 
compatibility (interconnectivity) rises, compared to the case of noncooperative 
competition.  
Using equation (8), because the collusive price is expressed as   ,1 CC qp   the 
profit in the case of collusion is given by    .1 2CC q   
Taking equations (6) and (10), we obtain the following relationship: 
  .)()(   NCNC nqq                           (11) 
Equation (11) indicates that if the net level of network compatibility effects is larger 
than the level of product substitutability, the output in the case of collusion is larger than 
that in the case of noncooperative competition.  
Suppose that there is either no network externality or the same level of compatibility 
under both collusion and noncooperative competition, i.e., 0n  or .NC    In this 
case, as is well known, collusion reduces output but increases prices compared to those 
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in the case of noncooperative competition. Furthermore, even with a positive network 
externality, these well-known results hold in the model of Song and Wong (2017), in 
which they assume that product substitutability is equal to compatibility, i.e., that 
,NC    as expressed in the notation of our model.  
However, given a strong network externality, i.e., ,n  based on assumption (ii), 
if the level of compatibility under collusion is sufficiently larger, collusive outputs do 
not necessarily decrease compared to those under noncooperative competition. For 
example, we can image the case of perfect compatible products under collusion (i.e.,
1C ) and incompatible products under noncooperative competition ( 0N ). Then, it 
holds that .NC qq   
With respect to the profits, we can derive the following relationships: 
 
 
       .0)(211
)(1)(




NCN
NCNC
nnn
qq
 
In view of (11), if   ,  NCn  then it holds that .NC    The above relationship 
can be also expressed as: 
       ,0)(111)(  nNCNC          (12) 
where        01221    and .01  n Regarding equation (12), 
even with   ,  NCn  if ,11
1 
 

N
C  then it holds that .NC    
Furthermore, if ,1
1
1 
 

N
C  equation (12) can be rewritten as: 
  ,)(,,)( nNCNC                            (13) 
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where        .0111,, 

CN
NC 
  Therefore, if   ,,, nNC    the 
firms have an incentive to collude.3 
We summarize the results analyzed above regarding the quantities and profits under 
collusion and noncooperative Cournot competition as Lemma1. 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) If   ,  NCn  it holds that NC qq   and .NC    
(ii-a) If     NCn  and ,11
1 
 

N
C  it holds that NC qq   and .NC    
(ii-b) If     NCn  and ,11
1 
 

N
C  it holds that NC qq   and 
  .)()(,, NCNC n    
 
Lemma 1 (ii-b) is similar to Song and Wong (2017), where they assume that product 
substitutability is equal to compatibility, i.e., .NC    However, Lemma 1 (i) 
implies that market concentration resulting from collusion does not necessarily 
negatively affect market performance. We will demonstrate this point in Section 3. 
 
2.4 The sustainability of collusion 
Here, we examine whether the firms have an incentive to deviate from collusion. 
Without generality, we assume that firm i deviates from collusion, given that firm j 
decides the collusive output level, i.e., Di qq   and .Cj qq   In this case, the profit 
                                                 
3 See equation (10) of Song and Wang (2017). 
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function can be represented by: 
  ,)( DeDCDD qSNqqA                              (14) 
where .eMD
e
D
e
D qqS    
We assume that .NDC    This assumption implies that the level of 
compatibility decreases if firm i deviates from collusion, but the level of compatibility 
is at least equal to that in the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. 
The FOC of profit maximization is: 
.0)(2 
 e
iCDii
D
D SNqqAqp
q
                   (15) 
When expectations are fulfilled, i.e., when D
e
D qq   and ,CeC qq   we obtain the 
following: 
.0)()2(  CDD qnqnA                             (16) 
Substituting equation (10) into equation (16), we derive the following output in the case 
of deviation. 
  
  
   .
2
2
)2(22
2
C
DC
C
DC
D qn
nn
nnn
Annq 

 
    (17) 
Given equations (10) and (17), we obtain the following: 
  .)()(   DCDC nqq                           (18) 
Because it holds that ,DD qp   the profit in the case of deviation is expressed as 
  .2DD q  Thus, with respect to the profits under collusion and deviation, we can 
derive the following relationship. 
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 
     .0)(211
)(1)(




DC
DCDC
nn
qq
 
The above relationship can be rewritten as: 
       ,0)(11)(  nDCDDC         (19) 
where      .0122  D   
If ,11   DC  it holds that .DC    Thus, the firm has an incentive to 
deviate from collusion because the difference in the level of compatibility is small 
between the cases of collusion and deviation. Conversely, if ,11   DC  
equation (19) can be rewritten as: 
 ,,,)()( DCDDC n                           (20) 
where        .011,,     DC DDCD  If   ,)(,, nNCD    the firm 
will (not) deviate from the collusion. 
Taking equations (18) and (19), regarding the incentive to deviate from the collusion, 
we present the following Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If   ,  DCn  it holds that .DC    Thus, the firms do not have an incentive 
to deviate. 
(ii-a) If     DCn  and ,11   DC  it holds that .DC    Thus, the 
firms have an incentive to deviate. 
(ii-b) If     DCn  and ,11   DC  it holds that 
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  .)(,,)( DCDCDn    Thus, the firms have an incentive to deviate if 
 .,, DCDn   
 
   Lemma 2 (i) and (ii-b) imply that, for firms to sustain collusion, it is necessary that 
the level of compatibility under collusion and the degree of the network externality are 
sufficiently large. 
Furthermore, in view of Lemma 2 (ii-a) and (ii-b), given that   ,  DCn  if 
either  11   DC  or  11   DC  and  ,,, DCDn   the 
collusion is not sustainable. However, as Pal and Scrimitore (2016), Song and Wang 
(2017), and Rasch (2017) show, assuming an infinitely repeated Cournot game with a 
trigger strategy punishment, we can also demonstrate that there exists a certain value of 
discount factor composed of network compatibility effects and product substitutability 
that makes the collusion sustainable. 
 
 
3. The Effect of Collusion on Social Welfare 
 
We consider the effect of collusion on social welfare, in particular, consumer surplus. 
Taking equation (1), consumer surplus is given by    ,21 2kk qCS  where 
., NCk   Thus, in view of equations (6) and (10), we derive the following relationship 
directly: 
  .)()()(   NCNCNC nqqCSCS             (21) 
Therefore, based on Lemmas1 (i) and 2 (i), and equation (21), we obtain the 
 13
following key result: 
 
Proposition 
If   ,  NCn  then the firms have an incentive to collude. In this case, the firms do 
not have an incentive to deviate from the collusion. The collusion increases consumer 
surplus, and thus social welfare, compared to the case of noncooperative Cournot 
competition. 
 
   The Proposition declares that collusion in a network industry does not necessarily 
reduce the resulting welfare level if the level of the network compatibility effect under 
collusion is sufficiently large, given a strong network externality. However, the prices 
rise compared to those in the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. In this sense, 
collusion may not be procompetitive even though the consumer surplus increases 
because of the strong network externality. 
   In contrast, if   ,  NCn  then the effect of collusion on consumer surplus is 
always negative. This case is similar to the result in the previous literature considering 
collusion with network externalities (e.g., Song and Wang, 2017). 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Assuming that the level of compatibility is upgraded under collusion, in other words, 
there us greater standardization between products and services compared to that in the 
case of noncooperative competition, we considered collusive behavior and its effect on 
 14
consumer surplus and social welfare.4 In particular, we demonstrated that collusion 
improves social welfare if the level of compatibility in the case of collusion is 
sufficiently large, given that a network externality is strong. That is, in this case, the 
collusive output levels are larger than those of noncooperative Cournot competition. We 
may observe such collusive behavior by firms in the telecommunications and Internet 
services market. 
   Our result has some limitations because our duopoly model is based on specific 
assumptions and linear functions. In future research, we intend to discuss more general 
cases, relaxing the assumptions and extending the model to oligopolistic competition. In 
the case of oligopoly, e.g., we must consider the presence of a firm that is an outsider to 
the collusion between other firms. Furthermore, we should consider monopolization 
(market concentration) of the markets that occurs through mergers and acquisitions and 
its effect on market performance and welfare. 
 
 
Appendix: The case of consumers’ ex post expectations 
 
Here, we consider the case of consumers’ ex post expectations. This implies that the 
firms can commit to their output levels, and on this basis, consumers then form 
expectations for the network size, i.e., i
e
i qq   and .jej qq   Thus, it holds that 
,jkii
e
i qqSS   where iS  is the actual network size of firm i’s product. In 
particular, we consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria, in which consumers observe 
                                                 
4 Formally, our model is related to joint ventures and strategic alliances (e.g., airlines). 
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output levels (capacities) before making their actual consumption decision. As 
consumers have to make their choice given the choices of all other consumers in the 
Nash equilibrium, each consumer’s beliefs about the behavior of other consumers are 
confirmed. Thus, equation (1) can be changed as follows: 
    ,1~ jkii qnqnAp    ,, NCk                    (A.1) 
where we assume that .1  n  This assumption implies that the own-price effect 
exceeds the cross-price effects at the point of the fulfilled expectation, i.e., .
j
i
i
i
q
p
q
p


   
   In the following, we confirm the robustness of our Proposition. 
(i) Cournot competition 
Taking equation (A.1), the profit function is      .1~ ijNii qqnqnA    The 
FOC is given by: 
      .0121~~ 

jNiii
i
i qnqnAqnp
q
          (A.2) 
At the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,~Nji qqq   we have: 
  .)(12~ NN nn
Aq                                  (A.3) 
In this case, because   ,~1~ NN qnq   the profit is represented as    .1~ 2NN qn   
(ii) Collusion 
The joint profit under collusion is given by: 
          .11
~~~
jiCjijCi
jiC
qqnqnAqqnqnA 



 
Thus, the FOC is: 
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   
    .0212
1~
~



jMi
jCii
i
C
qnqnA
qnqnp
q


                       (A.4) 
At the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,~Cji qqq   we have: 
  .)(212~ CC nn
Aq                                 (A.5) 
Furthermore, the collusive price is    .~)(1~ CCC qnnp    Thus, the profit per 
product is     .~)(1~ 2CCC qnn    
Using equations (A.3) and (A.5), we can derive the following relationships: 
  .)(2~)(~   NCNC nqq                         (A.6) 
Thus, (A.6) implies that if   ,  NCn  as in the condition in Proposition, then 
collusion increases the consumer surplus compared to that in the case of noncooperative 
Cournot competition. 
Regarding the comparison of the profits, that is, the condition of incentive to collude, 
we have: 
       .~1)(~1~)(~ 22 NCCNC qnqnn    
Substituting equations (A.3) and (A.5) into the relationship, we can derive the 
following: 
      .014~~ 2  NCNNC nnn                (A.7) 
Thus, in the case of consumers’ ex post expectations, the firms always have an incentive 
to collude. 
Furthermore, given that the other firm’s output is at the collusive level, the output of 
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the deviating firm is given by 
    
  .~12
212~
C
DC
D qn
nnq 
   Thus, with respect 
to the profits under collusion and deviation, we can derive the following relationship: 
         .0)(14~)(~ 2  DCCDCDC nnnn   
In this case, if     NCn  and ,DN    we have     ,1 2  NCnn  
given the assumption, i.e., that .1  n  It holds that DC  ~~   because
         .14 22 DCCDC nnnn    Therefore, the firms do not have an 
incentive to deviate from collusion. 
Based on the analysis above, in the case of consumers’ ex post expectations, we can 
demonstrate that the Proposition is robust. 
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